Part-IV
The power of a court to secure the ends of justice is not confined to the expressly enumerated provisions of procedural law. As discussed in the earlier parts of this series, the law recognises certain inherent powers that enable courts to respond to situations where the ordinary procedural framework may not provide an adequate answer. These powers, however, are not unlimited; they must be exercised with restraint, caution and in furtherance of the interests of justice.
In this concluding part of the series, we turn to the remaining situations in which courts may invoke their inherent powers. These situations illustrate the practical significance of the doctrine and demonstrate how courts have used inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process, address procedural gaps and ensure that the administration of justice is not defeated by technicalities.
The discussion that follows will examine these situations through the judicial approach adopted by courts, while also highlighting the limits within which such powers may legitimately be exercised. The objective is to understand not merely whether a court possesses an inherent power, but when and how that power may be appropriately invoked.
Consolidation of suits under Inherent Powers
A Single Judge Bench comprising of Soumen Sen, J. in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v. Impressions, 2018 SCC OnLine Cal 4497, allowed an application filed under Clause 13 of Letters Patent Act, 1865 for transfer of suit from City Civil Court to the High Court. The applicant filed a suit in the High Court under Section 6 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 for recovery of possession on the ground that he was dispossessed wrongfully and forcibly. The defendant filed a suit before the City Civil Court for an injunction restraining the applicant from use and enjoyment of the suit premises. The present application was filed praying for transfer of the suit from the City Civil Court to the High Court. The Court heard both the parties and noted, there was no doubt that the issues in both the suits were not entirely similar. However, the Court observed that although the issues may not be the same; but the same set of evidence and witnesses would be required to prove the respective issues. Further, Section 151 CPC gives the Court an inherent power to direct consolidation of suits. The Court was of the view that it was just and convenient if both the matters were tried together; it would not only minimize the time but would save expenses. Accordingly, the suit pending before the City Civil Court was directed to be transferred to the High Court.
Consolidation of Suits that are falling under CPC Section 10
The case of P.P. Gupta vs. East Asiatic Co. Bombay adjudicated by the Allahabad High Court on July 21, 1959, addresses a pivotal issue in civil litigation: the consolidation of multiple suits between the same parties under the Indian Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). This case revolves around a contractual dispute where both parties filed separate suits arising from the same transaction, leading to an examination of whether the inherent powers of a civil court to consolidate suits are overridden by the mandatory provisions of Section 10 of the CPC. Summary of the Judgment
P.P. Gupta purchased a printing press from the East Asiatic Company for Rs. 19,000, paying Rs. 5,220 as an advance. A dispute arose concerning the installation and performance of the machinery. Gupta filed Suit No. 98 of 1955 seeking a refund of Rs. 6,991.71 and damages for breach of contract. Subsequently, the East Asiatic Company filed Suit No. 38 of 1956 seeking the balance payment of Rs. 13,848.12.
Both suits originated from the same contract, with each party accusing the other of breach. The Additional Civil Judge of Agra consolidated the two suits, an order that Gupta contested, arguing that Section 10 of the CPC should bar such consolidation.
The Allahabad High Court, after a detailed examination of legal provisions and precedents, held that the inherent power of the court to consolidate suits is not negated by Section 10 of the CPC. The Court emphasized that consolidation serves the purpose of avoiding multiplicity of litigation, aligning with the objectives of Section 10.
Consequently, the High Court dismissed Gupta’s revision and upheld the consolidation of the two suits, directing an expedited hearing.
Section 10 prevents courts of concurrent jurisdiction or even the same court from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in dispute between the same parties. The fundamental purpose of this prohibition is to avoid the possibility of a conflict of decisions between two courts of competent jurisdiction deciding the same dispute between the same parties, and where disputes are pending in the same court, to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The real question to be decided in this revision, however is whether the principle underlying Sec. 10 goes to the extent of taking away the power of the court to consolidate different suits between the same parties which may be pending in the name court and in which the matter in issue is directly and substantially the same.
Section 10 of the CPC does not bar the institution of a second suit during the pendency of an earlier one in which the matter in issue is the same; it merely directs that the trial of the later suit cannot be proceeded with. The court in which the second suit is filed is properly seized of it. It is a court of the competent jurisdiction as regards that suit. Section 10 therefore does not go to the root of the jurisdiction of the court trying the second suit, but merely lays down a rule of procedure; it directs the Court to wait till the decision of the earlier suit. As was held by Vivian Bose, J. in Ganga Prasad v. Mt., Banaspati, AIR 1937 Nag 132, a rule of procedure can be waived.
The principles enunciated above should be borne in mind when interpreting Section 10 of the CPC for the purpose of determining whether the language of this section prohibits the consolidation of two suits pending in the same court between the same parties even if such consolidation is otherwise eminently desirable. In my opinion, it was not the intention of the legislature to pass a law which would bar such consolidation. As stated in an earlier portion of this judgment, the object of Sec. 10 is to prevent different courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue and also to avoid multiplicity of litigation in the same court.
In my view, therefore, the words “shall not proceed in any suit” in Section 10 of the CPC were intended to bar the separate trial of any suit in which the matter in issue was also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties in the same court or in any other court. But these words do not apply to the simultaneous hearing of a later and an earlier suit, after consolidation of the two, if the matter in issue in both is directly and substantially the same. Section 10 was not intended to take away the inherent power of the Court to consolidate in the interests of justice in appropriate cases different suits between the same parties in which the matter in issue is substantially the same. There is no conflict in the principle and purpose underlying Sec. 10 and the inherent power of the Court to consolidate different suits in appropriate cases. Both are meant to prevent multiplicity of litigation between the same parties. Any interpretation of Sec. 10 which takes away the power of the Court to consolidate suits would hinder the policy and purpose of Sec. 10 itself.
Conclusion
The Allahabad High Court’s judgment in P.P. Gupta v. East Asiatic Co. Bombay underscores the judiciary’s commitment to balancing procedural mandates with the pursuit of justice. By affirming the inherent power to consolidate suits, the Court not only aligned with the fundamental objectives of Section 10 of the CPC but also promoted judicial efficiency and coherence. This decision serves as a guiding precedent for future cases involving multiple lawsuits arising from the same transaction, ensuring that the legal process remains streamlined and just.
The ruling reinforces the principle that while statutory provisions provide a framework for legal proceedings, the inherent powers of the courts play a crucial role in managing cases effectively. This harmonious interpretation fosters a legal environment where justice is administered efficiently without being hampered by procedural technicalities.
Refund of Court Fees paid in excess or collected and assessed illegally
Jawahar Singh Sobha Singh vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 14 August, 1957, (AIR 1958 P&H 38)
The following question has been referred for decision of the Full Bench:-
“Is the power of a Court to remit or refund Court-fees confined only to fees illegally or erroneously assessed or collected or does it extend also to fees which have been paid or collected in accordance with the provisions of the Court-fees Act?”
The framers of the Court-fees Act made express provisions for its refund under certain contingencies. Under Section 13 of that Act court-fee is refunded firstly, where a plaint or memorandum of appeal rejected by the lower Court on any one of the grounds mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure is ordered by the appellate Court to be received, and secondly, where a suit is remanded in appeal on any of the grounds mentioned in Order 41 Rule 23 of that Code. In both cases the appellate Court is required to issue a certificate authorising the appellant to receive back from the revenue authorities the court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal. This section does not authorise the refund of court-fee in cases where it is paid other than on memorandum of appeal or plaint.
Refund of court-fee is also contemplated by Section 10(i). Where the Court finds that the plaintiff has over estimated the value of the property, it has a discretion to refund the excess fee which has been paid by the plaintiff. Section 14 contains a provision for refund of court-fee paid on an application for review of a judgment. Section 15 makes the grant of refund of court-fee obligatory on the Court where the Court reverses or modifies its former decision on the ground of mistake in law or fact. In such a case the applicant is entitled to a certificate from the Court authorising him to receive back from the Collector so much of the fee paid on the application for review of the judgment as exceeds the fee payable on any other application to such Court under the Second Schedule. Section 19A grants relief by way of refund of court-fee where a person applies for probate of a will or letters of administration estimating the property of the deceased to be of greater value than it subsequently proves to be and in consequence thereof he has paid excess court-fee. The difference in court-fee actually paid and which should have been paid is refundable.
Understanding the principles of Interpretation
Thus the statute has expressly specified the instances when, and the occasions on which an applicant may obtain relief by way of refund of court-fee paid by him in excess. The question that calls for decision is, whether outside the confines of the provisions of the Court-fees Act relating to refund, the Court, has the jurisdiction or the power to grant relief. Jurisdiction of a Court emanates directly from the law and if such a power has not been conferred by law, it cannot be exercised except in the rare circumstances to which reference will shortly be made, as where such a power inheres in Court. Except in cases where power to refund court-fee is constitutionally conferred under a Legislative sanction it will not be intra vires of a Court to grant relief even if it otherwise considers it to be in consonance with dictates of justice.
The maxims expressum facit cessare tacitum (what is expressed makes what is silent to cease) and expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another) are principles of logic & common sense which are applicable both in the construction of written instruments as well as in the interpretation of statutes. The Courts presume that when a statute has expressly dealt with some situations, conditions or requirements all that it had intended to convey, it has communicated in express language and there is no further power given, or duty cast, to add to it. In other words where a statute enumerates, the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons affected, or forbids certain things, it is to be construed as excluding from its purview, what it has failed to specify.
Every positive direction mentioned in an Act of Legislature carries an implication against everything contrary to it, the specification of one particular subject excludes all others and affirmation of one power implies the denial of the powers not mentioned. Cassus omissus is not to be created or supplied, and a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made. It is not the function of the Court to supply a defect or an omission or make up a deficiency which the Legislature could easily have supplied or made vide Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) 6 Moo P. C. 1 (Z6), Gwynne v. Burnell, (1840) 7 Cl. and F. 572 (Z7), and Craies on Statute Law Fifth Edition page 67. In the language of Lord Dunedin “express enactment shuts the door to further implication” vide Whiteman v. Sadler, (1910) A. C. 514 at p. 527 (Z8).
What is inherent power
The next question, that calls for examination is whether it is open to the Courts to fill the lacuna from the reserve of the powers that inhere in them. Inherent power is an authority possessed without its being derived from any external source. It is a right, ability or faculty of doing a thing without receiving that right, ability or faculty from another vide 43 C. J. S. page 393. ‘Jurisdiction is conferred on Courts by Constitutions and Statutes where as ‘inherent’ powers are those which are necessary to ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction already conferred vide State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County (Ariz.) 5 P. (2d) 192, 194 (Z9). The word ‘inherent’ means “existing in something as a permanent attribute or quality, a characteristic or essential element of something, indwelling, intrinsic, essential” (Oxford English Dictionary).
They spring not from legislation, but from the nature and constitution of the tribunals themselves. These are inseparable powers which the Legislature did not confer and therefore cannot take away, without destroying, the very foundation of the Court affected. It is a power, which is necessary to preserve the Court’s existence and to fully protect it in the orderly administration of its business. Inherent power is from its very nature essentially a protective power necessary for the existence of the Court and its due functioning. Its scope cannot be extended beyond its legitimate and circumscribed sphere. The inherent powers defy enumeration. They include powers necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction; essential for its functioning, and imperative for the preservation of its existence. Previous to the enactment of the statute relating to Law of Contempt, the inherent power included the right to protect itself from contempt.
These powers were not conferred by Legislation but they resided in the Court for its preservation, for the maintenance of its dignity, for securing obedience to its process and for protecting its officers engaged in executing its orders. But this inherent power cannot be stretched to cover a wider field. In the disguise of exercising their inherent powers Courts cannot proceed to arrogate the functions of Legislature. It is true that occasionally Courts may feel tempted on grounds of hardship or in the interest of justice or fair-play to invoke these powers, but vague and nebulous considerations of hardship or injustice are snares into which Courts should not permit themselves to be drawn. These considerations are apt to introduce uncertainty and obscurity in the interpretation of statutes where exactness and precision should be the objective.
Conclusion
Finally the court held that the power of a Court to remit or refund court-fee beyond the act is confined only to fees which have been illegally or erroneously assessed or collected, and does not extend to fees which have been paid or collected in accordance with the provisions of the Court-fees Act.
Imposition of costs for injustice caused to plaintiff during the pendency of the suit
Costs under CPC
General Costs under Civil Procedure Code: Section 35 of Civil Procedure Code
Section 35 of the CPC deals with general costs, which are awarded to litigants to cover the expenses incurred during litigation. The primary objective of awarding costs under this section is to ensure that the successful party is compensated for the legal expenses they have borne.
Miscellaneous Costs under Civil Procedure Code: Order 20A
Order 20A of the CPC specifically addresses the power of the court to award costs for certain expenses incurred during litigation. These expenses include:
- Giving notices
- Typing charges
- Inspection of records
- Producing witnesses
- Obtaining copies
The inclusion of miscellaneous costs under Order 20A aims to cover specific, often overlooked, expenses that parties incur in the process of litigation. By doing so, the CPC ensures that parties are adequately compensated for all legitimate expenses.
Compensatory Costs under Civil Procedure Code: Section 35A
Section 35A provides for compensatory costs, which serve as an exception to the general rule of costs under Section 35. This section is designed to address situations where Section 35 does not offer sufficient compensation, particularly in cases involving false or vexatious claims or defences. (Max 3K)
Conditions for Awarding Compensatory Costs
For Section 35A to apply, the following conditions must be met:
- False or Vexatious Claim/Defense: The claim or defence must be false or vexatious, brought with malicious intent.
- Objection by the Other Party: The other party must have raised an objection that the claim or defence was false or vexatious, to the knowledge of the party raising it.
- Disallowed, Withdrawn or Abandoned Claim: The claim must have been disallowed, withdrawn or abandoned, either in whole or in part.
The maximum amount that can be awarded under Section 35A is Rs. 3,000. It is important to note that this section applies only to suits, not to appeals or revisions. This provision empowers the court to impose compensatory costs on parties who misuse the legal process for vexatious purposes.
Costs for Causing Delay: Section 35B
Section 35B addresses costs for causing delays during litigation. This section empowers the court to impose costs on parties who cause unnecessary delays at any stage of the litigation process, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the case.
In such cases, the court may order the party responsible for the delay to pay costs to the other party. This provision ensures that the litigation process is not unduly prolonged and that parties act diligently and in good faith.
Case Title: In Re: Directions in the matter of Demolition of Structures v. and Ors. | Writ Petition (Civil) No. 295 of 2022 (and connected case), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 884
The Court also held that the public officials who demolish the properties in such a manner should be held accountable.
“Public officials who take law in their hands and act in such a high-handed manner must be fastened with accountability…” the Court observed while highlighting the importance of restitution.
Based on the above-mentioned precedent our answer is Yes, a court can award costs for injustice suffered by a plaintiff during a suit under its inherent powers, as long as it is for the ends of justice and does not conflict with any express provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). This power is broad and aims to prevent the abuse of court processes and ensure justice is served when specific provisions are lacking.
Rest to follow in the next part