Part-II
Having examined the conceptual foundations and the legal principles governing the exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 in the preceding part, it is now appropriate to turn to the arena where these principles are truly tested – the everyday functioning of civil courts. The exercise of inherent jurisdiction is seldom prompted by abstract questions of law; rather, it is invoked to resolve practical difficulties that arise in the course of judicial proceedings and for which the Code offers no express solution. Equally, there are situations where an appeal to Section 151, though seemingly attractive, would amount to circumventing the legislative scheme and must therefore be resisted. This part of the blog focuses on such recurring practical issues, drawing attention to the circumstances that justify the exercise of inherent powers, the limitations that circumscribe them, and the judicial approach that best reconciles procedural discipline with the overarching objective of securing the ends of justice.
Can’t confer jurisdiction on a court that doesn’t have
In case of National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. C. Rameswara, MANU/SC/1063/2004: AIR 2005 SC 242 it was held that inherent power of court is undoubtedly affirmed by Section 151 of the Code. Where the Code deals expressly with a particular matter, the provision should normally be regarded as exhaustively. In present case in clause 34 of the agreement, the parties have bound themselves that any matter arising between them under the said contract, it is the Courts in Calcutta alone which will have jurisdiction. Once parties bound themselves as such it is not open to them to choose a different jurisdiction as in the present case by filing the suit at Bhubaneshwar such suit would be in violation of the said agreement.Held, the suit filed by respondent is the city Civil Court at Bhubneshwar would not be valid and the Courts at Calcutta alone would be competent court to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and hence finding to the contrary given by courts below is hereby set aside. (Jurisdiction when barred can’t be assumed by using inherent powers)
Section 151 vs Order VII Rule 11 CPC
According to Order 7 R 11 CPC, “ The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases :-
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) Where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) Where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) Where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) Where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9
Under the proviso to the above added with effect from 1.2.1977 by the amendment Act of 1976 the time to be fixed by the Court under clauses (b) and (c) above “shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature” for doing the needful.
On the clauses (e) and (f) newly added by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Acts 1999 & 2002 in A.I.R 2003 S.C 189 the Supreme Court has observed that there should not be automatic rejection under these clauses but the Court should “ordinarily give an opportunity for rectifying the defects and in the event of same not being done the Court will have the liberty or the right to reject the plaint”. Rule 12 requires that the Judge upon rejecting the plaint shall record an order to that effect with reasons for such order and lastly Rule 13 says that the rejection of plaint under any of the clauses under Rule 11 shall not of its own force preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action. Section 2(2) of the Code defines a “decree” and it includes rejection of a plaint. Thus an order rejecting a plaint is appealable under section 96 of the Code.
Whether setting aside the rejection of plaint under clause (c) is permissible under Section 151 CPC
On the law and the principles emanating from the Supreme Court one would think that there would be uniformity and decisiveness in application or otherwise of section 151 of the Code to order of rejection of plaint especially rejection under clause (c) of Rule 11 of order VII.
Among the High Courts that have had occasion to deal with the question are Kerala High Court, Karnataka High Court, Hyderabad High Court, Gujarat High Court, Rajasthan High Court and Patna High Court. Authoritative view of these High Courts is that a petition under Section 151 of the Code is not competent to set aside an order of rejection ofa plaint, the order being a decree in Law. The latest case from Kerala is reported in A.I.R 2001 Kerala 353 Mable Vs. Dolores. This division Bench Judgment can be said to be the authorititive pronouncement from Kerala High Court. It has overruled not only A.I.R 1959 Ker 406 and A.I.R 1999 Ker 185 but also has overruled another single Bench judgment of Kerala High Court reported in (1992) 2 Ker LJ 84. The Judgment relies on AI.R 1962 SC 527 A.I.R 1964 S.C 993 and A.I.R 1966 S.C 1899. The Judgment lays down that “a remedy by way of an appeal has necessarily to be understood as a substantive remedy available to a party and that “when an appeal is provided, the party aggrieved gets an opportunity to have his whole case reconsidered by the appellate Court”. It is unequivocally held that a plaintiff is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under section 151 of the Code when a plaint gets rejected in terms of Order VII Rule 11.
The question fell for determination directly before Karnataka High Court in A.I.R 1987 Karnataka 264. The judgment quoted the para excerpted hereinbefore from Mulla’s C.P.C 16th edition at page 1425 from the 14th Edition at page 787. The judgment lays down in no uncertain terms:
“But when the Civil Procedure Code has provided for the remedy of an appeal against the rejection of the plaint, it, in my opinion, would not be open to the Court to have recourse to the inherent power under S 151 C.P.C, and recall the order of rejecting the plaint. If such requests are to be granted, then the remedy provided by the Civil Procedure Code for appeal would be meaningless”
In Kishorlal Vs Surajmal A.I.R 1956 Rajasthan 164 the view that order rejecting a plaint being a decree there is no power left in the Court to restore the plaint under Section 151 C.P.C has been upheld by Rajasthan High Court. (Court becomes functus officio)
No Condonation of Delay in filing suits under Inherent Powers
In Civil Appeal No. 1079 of 2004. D/d. 8.9.2005., Damodaran Pillai & Others Versus South Indian Bank Ltd. it was held that no, a civil court cannot use its inherent powers (under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure) to condone the delay in filing a suit because such power is already provided for under the Limitation Act, 1963, specifically in Section 5, which deals with condonation of delay by showing “sufficient cause”. Indian courts are bound by the principle that inherent powers cannot be invoked to override or bypass specific statutory provisions, and the law of limitation cannot be extended by such powers to allow stale claims. Reasons being:
Specific Statutory Provision Exists:
The Limitation Act, 1963, provides a specific mechanism for condoning delays, allowing courts to condone delays if a “sufficient cause” is shown.
Subordination of Inherent Power to Express Provisions:
Courts cannot use their inherent powers (Section 151 CPC) to do something that is not permitted by a specific law. If there is a specific provision dealing with an issue, the inherent powers cannot be used to achieve a different outcome.
Rest to follow in the next part of the blog